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British political institutions have 
shown resilience during the Brexit 
crisis. London apparently believes 
it has the scope to put EU talks be-
hind it and recalibrate its position in 
the world. The British government is 
carrying out an integrated review of 
defense, aid, and foreign policy and 
preparing its presidency of the COP26 
climate talks and G7. By contrast, its 
neighbors are gripped by the notion 
of Britain’s further constitutional de-
terioration. Their perceptions could 
well become self-fulfilling.
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson ap-
pears to be reaching his built-in ob-
solescence – exhausted by his brush 
with COVID-19, earning too little as 
PM to pay his large child support bill, 
and on the cusp of completing his 
Brexit mission (one way or another). 
Across Europe, there is specula-
tion that he, like US President Donald 
Trump, may soon go. But although 
Trump and Johnson are frequently 
bracketed together, nobody in Europe 
envisages a British “course correc-
tion.” A possible Biden presidency has 
encouraged talk of a transatlantic 
revival, but discussion about Britain 
focuses only on how far the country 
will continue to slide.
This is understandable. Because the 
British have terminated their mem-
bership in the European Union, there 
can clearly be no return to the status 
quo ante in UK-EU relations. But more 
than this, Britain is seen to be on an 
unstoppable descent into factional-
ism and fragmentation. These days, a 
weekend break on Brexit Island seems 
to promise, in the north, a revolt by 
mayors or Scots and, to the south, a 
violent standoff with French fisher-
men and perhaps migrants hijacking 
an oil tanker. But Britons themselves 




In European capitals, narratives of the 
UK’s impending crash are rarely artic-
ulated but implicit everywhere. The 
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CUBA-SUR-CALAIS
The UK becomes an unstable rev-
olutionary island off the coast of 
the EU – fertile ground for foreign 
influence operations to destabilize 
mainland Europe.
The coronavirus pandemic knocked  
20 percent off British GDP, 
exhausting the cash reserves of 
businesses and unleashing an 
economic impact even bigger than 
Brexit. That calamity does not, 
however, appear to have made the 
UK’s leaders more risk averse. Quite 
the opposite. The government is in 
thrall to a small dissident group of 
advisors that preaches a revolu-
tionary theory of “disruptive inno-
vation.” Emboldened by COVID-19, 
this group hopes to jolt the UK’s 
economy and institutions. Conse-
quently, there is a growing fear in 
Europe that these ideologues are 
turning Britain into a poorly- 
governed offshore hub preyed 
upon by large outside powers – 
China or Russia – that use it to 
influence or destabilize the EU.
CURRENT SYMPTOMS:
• Suspension from the party  
 of moderate Conservative  
 politicians
• Attempts to meet the UK’s  
 post-Brexit needs in border  
 control either by hiring customs  
 agents through driving up mass  
 unemployment or simply  
 waiving the rules
• Attempt by government advisor  
 to hire “weirdos and misfits” for  
 Boris Johnson’s team
WEST  
ERDOĞANISTAN
The UK apes the strongman ma-
joritarian democracies of the EU’s 
southeast, extracting concessions 
from the EU with the threat of 
unleashing crime and chaos.
The government led by Prime 
Minister Theresa May (2016–2019) 
inched toward Brexit by polarizing 
society. She used the powers of 
Britain’s majoritarian democracy, 
siding with the narrow majority in 
favor of leaving. When Johnson 
became PM, he further centralized 
power. Although the question of 
EU membership is now settled, 
the new societal cleavage (by age 
and education) remains. This split 
can be clearly seen in the differing 
opinions on the UK’s coronavirus 
lockdown as Remain voters resist 
central government. Some in 
the EU now see the specter of a 
polarized majoritarian democracy 
with permanent single party rule 
controlling the media and courts. 
In this case, the UK is a country 
that leverages its own breakdown 
to squeeze concessions from the 
EU – in short, a second Turkey.
CURRENT SYMPTOMS:
• Political attacks by  
 Conservative government on  
 “remainer MPs,” the  
 “metropolitan” BBC, “leftist  
 lawyers,” and the courts
• Attempts to pass lucrative  
 government contracts related to 
 the coronavirus crisis to friends  
 of the party
• Insertion of government  
 political advisors onto scientific  
 advisory groups on COVID-19
GLOBAL BREXIT 
The UK swiftly loses the vestiges 
of its former global power status, 
creating ripples that reach up to 
the highest international level 
and out along its web of overseas 
territories.
Prior to the Brexit vote, the UK 
had seemed to have adapted 
to the modern world and the 
loss of its imperial status. But, 
unlike France or Germany, it did 
so primarily by allying with the 
US rather than folding itself 
wholeheartedly into the EU. Now 
squeezed between the EU and 
US, and with the wise heads in the 
Foreign Office sidelined, the UK 
appears unequal to its inherited 
legacy. Last year, fears grew that 
the UK would crash out of the EU 
only for a radical Labor government 
to withdraw from NATO and then 
abolish Britain’s nuclear capabil-
ity. Today, the fear is more about 
Johnson’s Britain regressing into  
a jingoistic mindset and instru-
mentalizing its old colonial rela-
tionships and status in old-style 
Realpolitik.
CURRENT SYMPTOMS:
• Sacking of Claire Perry,  
 president of COP26
• Anger in offshore British  
 territories at attempts by  
 London to regulate their  
 fisheries
• Delay to UK’s integrated  
 defense review
• Baffling strategic investment  
 in bankrupt Indian satellite firm  
 Oneweb as alternative to EU’s  
 Galileo program
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HOW FEARS BECOME 
SELF-FULFILLING
These visions of Britain’s future tra-
jectory are, inevitably, based on fears 
and misperceptions. And such worst-
case scenarios have a peculiar habit 
of becoming self-fulfilling, especially 
in the hands of the EU. All too often, 
Brussels deploys its famous “transfor-
mative power” on the basis of stereo-
types of “the other,” and brings out the 
worst in its partners. There is a risk 
that this dynamic will also play out in 
the UK’s case as illustrated by these 
responses:
Revolutionary Britain: The EU, be-
cause it fears something akin to the 
Cuba scenario, is pursuing a “thick” 
trade deal with the UK, offering it ac-
cess to EU markets under intrusive 
conditions – notably on state aid but 
also internal security and foreign poli-
cies. Tensions rose in September 2020 
following the presentation of the In-
ternal Market Bill: while the UK views 
the bill as a fallback to protect its au-
tonomy if talks fail, the EU treats it as 
a gross infringement of international 
law. As the EU reasserts its trade con-
ditions, its assertiveness may well 
backfire, encouraging even cautious 
elements in the UK government to run 
down the clock on talks. London be-
lieves the less time the EU has for the 
ratification of the deal, the slimmer its 
demands will be.
Ironically, it is not the revolutionary 
radicals but rather the large recent in-
take of risk-averse Conservative MPs 
from fragile northern cities who will 
drive Britain into foreign hands. They 
want the UK to hedge its bets vis-à-
vis the EU and seek access to new 
global markets, raise capital, and at-
tract cheap foreign infrastructure. 
They do not view the UK as a play-
thing of global geopolitics, of course. 
But as they seek transactional deals, 
they are putting the UK up for sale. Al-
ready, the UK appears to have offered 
defense ties in Central Europe and the 
Persian Gulf in expectation of sweet-
heart trade deals. It has also begun 
using development and humanitarian 
spending to court international rela-
tions. This is fertile ground for China 
and others.
Strongman Britain: The EU fears 
that a situation similar to that on its 
southeastern flank will emerge to its 
northwest – the UK half in and half 
out, frozen in limbo. Its fear is pri-
marily of Balkanization; it does not 
want the responsibility of gluing to-
gether the fractious successor states 
of a “disunited kingdom.” But fear-
ing a new Balkans, the EU could end 
up creating a second Turkey. The UK 
is a highly centralized state, but the 
EU only sees its centrifugal effects: 
58 percent of Scots are said to be in fa-
vor of independence; 51 percent of the 
population of Northern Ireland want 
a referendum on a united Ireland. Its 
fear of a messy Brexit has led the EU to 
demand decisive commitments from 
the UK, backing these demands up 
with carrots and sticks of its own.
Like Turkey, Britain is a state trying 
to move away from the EU, seeking to 
carve out its own strategic environ-
ment. Brussels, however, is neverthe-
less applying the tools of tutelage: it 
sees no problem in using its economic 
levers to discipline the UK. Among 
Leave voters, this amounts to eco-
nomic warfare and foreign interfer-
ence; they see support for European 
engagement as almost treasonous. EU 
integration, which was meant to set-
tle the UK’s international identity, has 
polarized it. This anger and polariza-
tion diminish the chances of a soft La-
bor government – with all the benefits 
that might bring for the devolution of 
power to the British regions, depoliti-
cization of central administration, and 
maturing of EU-UK relations.
Brutish Empire: European diplomats 
fear a return to a retrograde imperial 
mindset from the UK. They place Brit-
ain on the (soft end) of a spectrum 
with other lost souls such as Turkey 
and Russia. Faced with neo-imperi-
alism, the EU defers to its member 
states, allowing old sores to reemerge. 
Some member states see Brexit as an 
opportunity to settle old territorial 
anomalies like Anguilla, Gibraltar, and 
the Falkland Islands, as well as the 
Cypriot airbases and even Northern 
Ireland, particularly since all these 
territories depend heavily on access 
to the EU to sustain their economies. 
Others treat Brexit as a way to in-
crease EU influence in the Arab world, 
Anglophone West, and East Africa and 
to establish a rather exclusive form 
of “EU sovereignty” at the expense of 
Anglo-Saxon influence.
Ironically, it is the moderate force of 
the Foreign Office that may begin in-
strumentalizing the UK’s global sta-
tus to counter this, trying to prove the 
UK’s continued value to its European 
partners. UK diplomats have been dis-
mayed by the shrinking trust of their 
European partners in international 
fora. At the UN Security Council, for 
example, the UK pictures itself as al-
most the sole honest broker on issues 
such as Libya. Now, however, there is 
a risk that the UK squanders this po-
sition by keeping tricky topics off the 
agenda to curry favor with France. 
Or that it uses its status in NATO, the 
Conference of Parties that signed the 
United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (COP), or the 
G7 for the narrow purposes of per-
suading Europeans to think outside 
the realm of “EU sovereignty” and in-
clude it in their work on security, cli-
mate, and the economy.
CORRECTING  
MISPERCEPTIONS
Brexit creates an optical illusion. It 
distorts the EU’s perception of the 
world, magnifying its sense of its own 
power through an unusual David and 
Goliath battle and reviving an archaic 
Eurocentric mentality. It recalls an era 
Avoiding “Cuba-sur-Calais” and Other Misadventures on Brexit Island








The German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful 
foreign and security policy on a German and 
European level that promotes democracy, 
peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan 
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP).
Publisher 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für  
Auswärtige Politik e.V.
ISSN 1864-347
Editing Helga Beck  
Layout Luise Rombach
Design Concept: WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAP
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
 Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 
 International License.
in which Europeans felt able to carve 
up world affairs between themselves. 
Moreover, it almost turns Britain’s de-
terioration into a matter of prestige 
for Europe – just as “Brexit contagion” 
across Europe is a matter of prestige 
for Britons. All of this serves to dis-
tort a simple reality: both the EU and 
Britain are diminishing themselves. 
A messy Brexit only shrinks Europe’s 
weight in the world as influence and 
capital seep out of London and f low 
not to the continent but to the rest of 
the world, notably China.
The rise of China is not an argument 
in favor of Brussels giving the UK a 
free pass. Rather, China’s ascendency 
means that the EU must learn how 
and when to use its weight, particu-
larly in its proximity abroad. Too often 
in the past ten years, the EU has com-
plained about being surrounded by an 
arc of instability – apparently without 
seeking a causal link to its own system 
of behavior. The UK, of course, has 
squandered much political good will 
in the past months. Even its closest al-
lies in Europe – in the EU’s north and 
east – view it as a recovering addict 
who may relapse into its previous er-
ratic behavior. But as with any rehabil-
itation, there is also a risk in not giving 
the UK a second chance.
Germany will be vital to any recali-
bration of relations between Europe-
ans and the UK and not just because 
it is a big player. Again and again in 
past weeks, the UK has aligned with 
German positions – on Turkey, the 
Middle East, and Libya – often more 
closely than have Germany’s own EU 
partners. Moreover and importantly, 
London says that it is doing so not for 
the expedient reason of gaining an EU 
trade deal but because its reading of 
its interests and values have led it to 
these positions. It is in Germany’s in-
terest to cooperate with the UK, even 
if that means acting outside the EU 
structures and siding against France 
in its understanding of “European 
Sovereignty.”
